Commit

05e8bda

Good catch — yes. Call it 'internal': no host ports, container exposed only on the compose network; Dokploy's Traefik (or any sibling proxy) joins that net and does ingress+TLS. It's distinct from loopback: loopback = a proxy on the HOST, internal = a proxy in a CONTAINER on the…
AXIS A — Title: 'How is it reached?' (pick one) Internal (behind an orchestrator) ✓ No host ports; exposed only on the compose network ✓ Dokploy/Traefik or a sibling proxy routes in and does TLS ⚠ Proxy is usually public — auth required by default → PUBLIC_URL is whatever…
Right now it's ALREADY two Caddys: an inner gateway Caddy (runs as 'gateway', does forward_auth + routing on 8080) and, in domain mode, a sidecar caddy:2-alpine that only TLS-terminates and reverse_proxies to agent-env:8080. I'd collapse to inner-only. The inner Caddy already…
Yes. I'd slice it into two PRs: 1. Caddy collapse — inner Caddy owns TLS, drop the sidecar. Standalone, low-risk, no new modes. 2. The 2-axis refactor — internal + wireguard + the Behavior copy, across generate.ts, setup.ts, the web step and tests. Starting (1) now in a…
Correction: I was wrong that 'internal' is new — it already exists as mode 'none' (exposes 8080+22, no published ports, you set PUBLIC_URL; orchestrator routes in). So Axis A today is really: local (loopback) / none (internal) / caddy (domain+TLS) / tailscale. Two notes vs what…
Heads-up while I build slice 1: the claw grant for agent-env has expired ('token exchange failed: token has expired'), so I can fetch the public repo read-only but can't push or open the PR. I'll have the code + passing tests ready regardless. @dtinth when you get a sec,…
Not yet — I'd paused for your read on the correction. My bad, building it now. I'll ping when generate.ts + the entrypoint TLS branch are done and tests pass. Push still waits on the claw re-grant whenever you get to it.
Slice 1 built & committed (branch worktree-caddy-collapse, f315ce1). The gateway Caddy terminates TLS itself now: no sidecar, publishes 80+443, cert on the state volume. 93 tests green, and I ran both the plain and TLS Caddyfiles through 'caddy validate' — all valid. The…
The domain and email is stored directly in compose.yaml file right? Not .env - it is exclusively for secrets and should very rarely change. Also, required .env keys should use the ${NAME:?} so it bails.
Yes — GATEWAY_TLS_DOMAIN and ACME_EMAIL are literal values in compose.yaml's environment list, not .env. .env stays secrets-only; this PR doesn't add a key to it. On ${NAME:?}: agree. It's orthogonal to the Caddy collapse though — it changes how required *secrets*…
Thanks — yes, slice 2 is the WireGuard mode (+ the Behavior copy, + the ${NAME:?} piggyback). The crux we didn't pin down is key/peer UX, and it drives the size. My rec: minimal, mirroring Tailscale. The configurator generates the server keypair (private key -> .env secret,…
Configurator should generate client configs too. You can do it in that PR.

commit 05e8bda

Got it — full client-config generation it is, in the slice 2 PR. Starting now. One thing I'll settle while building: where the X25519 keygen runs (Node crypto in setup.ts, Web Crypto in the browser, keys passed into generate.ts as answers like the cookie secret). Will report…
Design settled, building. The nice bit: wireguard needs zero entrypoint changes — it mirrors tailscale (agent-env shares the wg sidecar's netns; a peer hits http://<server-wg-ip>:8080 over the tunnel; only the UDP ListenPort is published). 3 calls I'm making: (1) server privkey…
Slice 2 is built — 5 commits, 100 tests green, web builds. WireGuard mode end to end: generate.ts engine, the setup.ts wizard (node:crypto keygen, writes wireguard/<peer>.conf per device, server key kept in .env across re-runs so existing configs stay valid), the browser…